Published Work
Animals, Freedom, and the Ethics of Veganism (in Animal Ethics in the Age of Humans: Blurring Boundaries in Human-Animal Relationships, eds. Bernice Bovenkerk and Jozef Keulartz, Springer 2016)
While moral arguments for vegetarianism have been explored in great depth, the arguments for veganism seem less clear. Although many animals used for milk and eggs are forced to live miserable lives on factory farms, it’s possible to raise animals as food resources on farms where the animals are treated more humanely and never slaughtered. Under more humane conditions, do we harm animals to use them for food? I argue that, even under humane conditions, using animals for food typically harms animals by restricting their freedom. My argument raises an important question about the extent to which animals are harmed when their freedom is restricted. On one view, it is possible to restrict animals’ freedom without harming them so long as we don’t make them suffer. This view underestimates the value of freedom for animals. Even if animals aren’t made to suffer, restricting their freedom can harm them insofar as it deprives them of freely pursuing their enjoyments in life. I also consider what we should do with farm animals if we cease using them for food.
Do All Subjects of a Life Have an Equal Right to Life? The Challenge of the Comparative Value of Life (in The Moral Rights of Animals, eds. Mylan Engel and Gary Comstock, Lexington Books 2016)
In The Case for Animal Rights, Tom Regan defends the view that all animals who are “subjects of a life” have an equal moral right to life. In this chapter, I consider whether it makes sense to think that animals have an equal right to life in light of the challenge that life has less value for animals than humans. This challenge raises two central questions: (1) does life have less value for animals than humans and (2) if it does, does this fact justify the view that animals do not have an equal right to life. I argue, first, that life has greater value for most humans than animals because most humans are capable of experiencing higher qualities of enjoyment in life, in the form of creative, intellectual pleasures. However, this does not justify denying that animals have an equal right to life. Whether beings’ lives deserve strong respect depends on whether the value of life for those beings meets a certain threshold. I argue that the value of life for many animals meets this threshold because it is compatible with the virtue of compassion.
In Defense of the Moral Significance of Empathy (Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, February 2014)
It is commonly suggested that empathy is a morally important trait to possess. This suggestion assumes that empathy involves feeling concern for others’ welfare. Skeptics challenge the moral importance of empathy by arguing that empathy is neither necessary nor sufficient to feel concern for others’ welfare. This challenge is misguided. Although not all forms of empathy are morally important, empathy in its fullest form with others' concerns for their basic welfare is both necessary and sufficient to care for others' welfare. Empathy in its fullest form includes both the cognitive and affective dimensions of empathy. I further contend that empathy of this form is a moral virtue. It is essential to being an ethical person, it is useful for promoting ethical behavior, and it possesses other traits essential to virtues, such as motivating one to aim for the moral good and disposing one to do virtuous things whenever appropriate opportunities arise.
Do Embryos Have Interests? Why Embryos Are Identical to Future Persons But Are Not Harmed by Death (Journal of Bioethical Inquiry, March 2012)
According to one argument, embryos are harmed by death because they are deprived of their valuable future lives as adult humans. Some have challenged this argument on the grounds that embryos aren’t identical to adults: either due to the potential for embryos to twin or because we do not exist until the fetus develops consciousness. I argue that these arguments fail and that embryos have future adult lives. However, I contend that their future lives don't have value for them since they are incapable of having desires. I illuminate the connection between having interests and having desires in a way that other authors have not done.
Two Arguments against Biological Interests (Environmental Ethics, Fall 2010)
What kinds of entities have interests worthy of moral consideration in our actions? According to one view, all living organisms have interests in the fulfillment of their biological functions. The standard arguments against this view are unsatisfactory. I suggest there are two reasons why we ought to reject the idea of biological interests. First, the idea of biological interests implies a metaphysically mysterious account of interests. Second, the idea of biological interests implies that what is good for humans is partly determined by things external to themselves, independent of their capacities for desires. This conflicts with the ideal of self-direction, according to which it is desirable that how we ought to live is grounded in one's own capacity for desires. It is still an open possibility that nonsentient entities are morally considerable in the sense of having intrinsic value.
Do Animals Have an Interest in Continued Life? In Defense of a Desire-Based Account (Environmental Ethics, Winter 2009)
Do we harm animals if we painlessly kill them? The idea that animals are harmed by death faces the challenge that animals are supposedly incapable of valuing their own future lives. Some people argue that death harms animals because it forecloses their future opportunities for pleasure. However, this argument is problematic because it's unclear why animals' future opportunities have value for them if they are incapable of caring about them. A more promising argument holds that many animals have an interest in life insofar as they have certain enjoyments in life, where animals' enjoyments are best understood not merely as fleeting experiences but rather as dispositional desires that animals continue to have over time.
Animals, Predators, the Right to Life, and the Duty to Save Lives (Ethics and the Environment, Spring 2009)
One challenge to the idea that animals have a moral right to life claims that any such right would require us to intervene in the wild to prevent animals from being killed by predators. I argue that belief in an animal right to life does not commit us to supporting a program of predator-prey intervention. One common retort to the predator challenge contends that we are not required to save animals from predators because predators are not moral agents. This retort fails to overcome the predator challenge. I aim to articulate a more satisfactory argument explaining why we are not required to save wild prey from predators even if animals have a basic right to life.
A Critique of Mary Anne Warren's Weak Animal Rights View (Environmental Ethics, Fall 2007)
In her book, Moral Status, Mary Anne Warren argues that animals may have some moral rights but that their rights are much weaker in strength than the rights of humans. Subsequently, she suggests it is frequently permissible to kill animals for food. Warren's argument for her view consists primarily in the thought that we have inevitable practical conflicts with animals that make it impossible to grant them equal rights without sacrificing basic human interests. I contend that Warren's argument fails to justify her conclusion that animals don't have an equal right to life and that it is permissible to kill animals for food.
While moral arguments for vegetarianism have been explored in great depth, the arguments for veganism seem less clear. Although many animals used for milk and eggs are forced to live miserable lives on factory farms, it’s possible to raise animals as food resources on farms where the animals are treated more humanely and never slaughtered. Under more humane conditions, do we harm animals to use them for food? I argue that, even under humane conditions, using animals for food typically harms animals by restricting their freedom. My argument raises an important question about the extent to which animals are harmed when their freedom is restricted. On one view, it is possible to restrict animals’ freedom without harming them so long as we don’t make them suffer. This view underestimates the value of freedom for animals. Even if animals aren’t made to suffer, restricting their freedom can harm them insofar as it deprives them of freely pursuing their enjoyments in life. I also consider what we should do with farm animals if we cease using them for food.
Do All Subjects of a Life Have an Equal Right to Life? The Challenge of the Comparative Value of Life (in The Moral Rights of Animals, eds. Mylan Engel and Gary Comstock, Lexington Books 2016)
In The Case for Animal Rights, Tom Regan defends the view that all animals who are “subjects of a life” have an equal moral right to life. In this chapter, I consider whether it makes sense to think that animals have an equal right to life in light of the challenge that life has less value for animals than humans. This challenge raises two central questions: (1) does life have less value for animals than humans and (2) if it does, does this fact justify the view that animals do not have an equal right to life. I argue, first, that life has greater value for most humans than animals because most humans are capable of experiencing higher qualities of enjoyment in life, in the form of creative, intellectual pleasures. However, this does not justify denying that animals have an equal right to life. Whether beings’ lives deserve strong respect depends on whether the value of life for those beings meets a certain threshold. I argue that the value of life for many animals meets this threshold because it is compatible with the virtue of compassion.
In Defense of the Moral Significance of Empathy (Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, February 2014)
It is commonly suggested that empathy is a morally important trait to possess. This suggestion assumes that empathy involves feeling concern for others’ welfare. Skeptics challenge the moral importance of empathy by arguing that empathy is neither necessary nor sufficient to feel concern for others’ welfare. This challenge is misguided. Although not all forms of empathy are morally important, empathy in its fullest form with others' concerns for their basic welfare is both necessary and sufficient to care for others' welfare. Empathy in its fullest form includes both the cognitive and affective dimensions of empathy. I further contend that empathy of this form is a moral virtue. It is essential to being an ethical person, it is useful for promoting ethical behavior, and it possesses other traits essential to virtues, such as motivating one to aim for the moral good and disposing one to do virtuous things whenever appropriate opportunities arise.
Do Embryos Have Interests? Why Embryos Are Identical to Future Persons But Are Not Harmed by Death (Journal of Bioethical Inquiry, March 2012)
According to one argument, embryos are harmed by death because they are deprived of their valuable future lives as adult humans. Some have challenged this argument on the grounds that embryos aren’t identical to adults: either due to the potential for embryos to twin or because we do not exist until the fetus develops consciousness. I argue that these arguments fail and that embryos have future adult lives. However, I contend that their future lives don't have value for them since they are incapable of having desires. I illuminate the connection between having interests and having desires in a way that other authors have not done.
Two Arguments against Biological Interests (Environmental Ethics, Fall 2010)
What kinds of entities have interests worthy of moral consideration in our actions? According to one view, all living organisms have interests in the fulfillment of their biological functions. The standard arguments against this view are unsatisfactory. I suggest there are two reasons why we ought to reject the idea of biological interests. First, the idea of biological interests implies a metaphysically mysterious account of interests. Second, the idea of biological interests implies that what is good for humans is partly determined by things external to themselves, independent of their capacities for desires. This conflicts with the ideal of self-direction, according to which it is desirable that how we ought to live is grounded in one's own capacity for desires. It is still an open possibility that nonsentient entities are morally considerable in the sense of having intrinsic value.
Do Animals Have an Interest in Continued Life? In Defense of a Desire-Based Account (Environmental Ethics, Winter 2009)
Do we harm animals if we painlessly kill them? The idea that animals are harmed by death faces the challenge that animals are supposedly incapable of valuing their own future lives. Some people argue that death harms animals because it forecloses their future opportunities for pleasure. However, this argument is problematic because it's unclear why animals' future opportunities have value for them if they are incapable of caring about them. A more promising argument holds that many animals have an interest in life insofar as they have certain enjoyments in life, where animals' enjoyments are best understood not merely as fleeting experiences but rather as dispositional desires that animals continue to have over time.
Animals, Predators, the Right to Life, and the Duty to Save Lives (Ethics and the Environment, Spring 2009)
One challenge to the idea that animals have a moral right to life claims that any such right would require us to intervene in the wild to prevent animals from being killed by predators. I argue that belief in an animal right to life does not commit us to supporting a program of predator-prey intervention. One common retort to the predator challenge contends that we are not required to save animals from predators because predators are not moral agents. This retort fails to overcome the predator challenge. I aim to articulate a more satisfactory argument explaining why we are not required to save wild prey from predators even if animals have a basic right to life.
A Critique of Mary Anne Warren's Weak Animal Rights View (Environmental Ethics, Fall 2007)
In her book, Moral Status, Mary Anne Warren argues that animals may have some moral rights but that their rights are much weaker in strength than the rights of humans. Subsequently, she suggests it is frequently permissible to kill animals for food. Warren's argument for her view consists primarily in the thought that we have inevitable practical conflicts with animals that make it impossible to grant them equal rights without sacrificing basic human interests. I contend that Warren's argument fails to justify her conclusion that animals don't have an equal right to life and that it is permissible to kill animals for food.
